LAYERED APPROACH FOR PERSONALIZED SEARCH ENGINE LOGS PRIVACY PRESERVING

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ABSTRACT

In this paper we examine the problem of defending privacy for publishing search engine logs. Search engines play a vital role in the navigation through the enormity of the Web. Privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) provides techniques and tools for publishing helpful information while preserving data privacy. Recently, PPDP has received significant attention in research communities, and several approaches have been proposed for different data publishing situations. In this paper we learn privacy preservation for the publication of search engine query logs. Consider a subject that even after eliminating all personal characteristics of the searcher, which can serve as associations to his identity, the magazine of such data, is still subject to privacy attacks from opponents who have partial knowledge about the set. Our tentative results show that the query log can be appropriately anonymized against the particular attack, while retaining a significant volume of helpful data. In this paper we learn about problem in search logs and why the log is not secure and how to create log secure using data mining algorithm and methods like Generalization, Suppression and Quasi identifier.

Index Terms: Search engine, log, Algorithm, Data mining method - Suppression, Generalization, Quasi Identifier.

1. INTRODUCTION:

Have you ever wondered what happens when you type your query into the Google search box and what data we store about that search? [1] Search involves interactions between two parties, a user (U) and a search engine (S). There are two basic interaction cycles between a user and a search engine: 1. Search: A user U composes and presents a query q to search engine S, and the search engine S would return a few search results \( R = f(R_1;:::; R_{ng}) \) to the user. 2. Browse: A user U chooses to view a Result \( R_i \), and the search engine would convey the user the content of \( R_i \).

In a search process connecting many such interaction cycles, a user thus potentially reveals the following. Three types of personal information:

1. User identity: This could be a personal user ID in the case when the user has to register an account, or the IP address of the machine that the user is using.
2. Queries: This includes all the queries the user has submitted to the search engine.
3. Viewed results: This includes all the viewed web pages by the user.

Actually, the user also reveals some context information such as the time stamp. Since such personal information can potentially reveal a gamut of user’s private life such as political inclination, family life, and hobbies, disclosing such information, particularly in an aggregated fashion, would clearly elevate serious apprehensions for users. One may notice that there is a remarkable difference between user’s queries and clicked search results. Since queries are composed by users themselves, thus directly reveal the user’s in sequence need, while the search results are composed by the Web page publishers. Thus in common, queries may enclose much more personally identifiable information (PII) than viewed search results. However, from the view point of privacy. Protection, both queries and viewed results can cause concerns for users and the difference appears to be not crucial. Let’s take a simple search like “cars.”

When someone types the word “cars” into the Google search engine, the demand gets sent from that user’s computer over the internet to our computers, which look for the accurate explore results. Once our computers have
found the results, they send these support to the User’s computer, all in a fraction of a second. We then store some data about this exchange: the search query (“cars”), the time and date it was typed, the IP address and cookie of the processor it was entered from, and its browser sort and operating system. We refer to these records as our search logs, and most websites accumulate records of visits to their site in a similar way. Here’s what a typical log entry at Google looks like:

1.1 IP address:
123.45.67.89 is the IP address assigned to the user’s computer by his or her overhaul provider. Just like other websites, when you ask Google for a page (a search results page, for example), we use your computer’s IP address to ensure that we get the right results back to the right computer. It’s significant to remember that IP addresses don’t say exactly where an being user is, or who they are. In fact, some Internet Service Providers (ISPs) give users a different IP address every time they log onto the web. The most Google can notify about a user from his computer’s IP address is that user’s general location (for example, Boston) and possibly the ISP they use to connect to the Internet. Only the ISP (who actually controls the user’s account) can match an individual with an IP address.

Time and date: 25/Aug/2011 10:15:32 is the date and time the user typed the query into Google.

Search query: http://www.google.com/search?q=cars is the search query, in this case “cars.”

Browsers and operating Systems: Chrome 2.0.0.7; Windows NT 5.1 is the browser and operating system being used.

Cookie: 740674ce2123a969 is the unique cookie ID assigned to a browser the first time a user visits Google. Similar to an IP address, a cookie doesn’t tell Google who a user actually is or where they live - it only identifies a computer. You can remove these cookies at any time in your computer’s browser.

1.2. ARCHITECTURE:

Internal Architecture [5]: The below figure provides a detailed view of the Search service internal architecture. Following are the components of the Search service’s architecture.

Index Engine: Processes the chunks of text and properties filtered from content sources, storing them in the content index and property store.

Query Engine: Executes keyword and SQL syntax uncertainty against the content index and search configuration data.

Protocol Handlers: Opens comfortable sources in their native protocols and exposes documents and other items to be filtered.

Filters: Opens documents and other content basis items in their native formats and filters into chunks of text and properties.

Content Index: Stores in sequence about words and their location in a content item.

Property Store: Stores a table of properties and associated values.

Search Configuration Data: Stores information used by the Search service, including crawl pattern, property schema, scopes, and so on.

Word breakers: worn by the query and index engines to break compound words and phrases into individual words or tokens.

Search Query Execution: When a search [6] query is carried out, the query engine passes the query through a language-specific word surf. If there is no word surf for the query language, the neutral word breaker is worn, which does whitespace-style word breaking, which means that the
word breaking happens where there are whitespaces in the words and phrases.

After word breaking, the resulting words are passed through a stemmer to generate language-specific inflected forms of a given word. The utilized of word breaker and stemmer in both the crawling and query processes enhances the effectiveness of search because more relevant alternatives to a user’s query phrasing are produced. When the query steam engine executes a property value query, the directory is checked first to get a list of probable matches. The properties for the identical documents are loaded from the property store, and the assets in the query are checked again to ensure that there was a contest. The result of the query is a list of all matching results, controlled according to their relevance to the query words. If the user does not have consent to a identical document, the query engine filters that document out of the list that is returned.

Logging Query Log
The information tracked in the query log includes:

1. The query terms being used
2. If Search results were returned for search queries
3. Pages that were viewed from search results

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Existing work on publishing logs make Scientists all around the world to tap this gold mine for their own research. The log contains sensitive information and Non-personal information

2.1. Sensitive information
“Sensitive personal information” includes in sequence we know to be related to confidential medical information, racial or ethnic origins, political or religious beliefs or sexuality and tied to personal information.

2.2. Non-personal information
“Non-personal information” is information that is recorded about users so that it no longer reflects or references an individually identifiable user. Thus in any search activity, the information a user $U$ potentially reveals when attempting to satisfy an information need $N$ can be represented as $(ID(U); TEXT(N))$, where $ID(U)$ is some ID revealed about the identity of the user (e.g., a user ID or an IP address), and $TEXT(N)$ is a text description of the information need $N$ (e.g., a set of related queries and/or viewed results). When a user conducts a series of $k$ search activities, the susceptible personal information that the user may reveal can be represented as $P(U) = f(ID(U); i); TEXT(N; i))g$ where $i = 1; \ldots; k$. The privacy concern of a user is that all or some of the information in $P(U)$ may be captured by some other people in the world. The anxiety may be less if $P(U)$ is revealed to some “trustable” party (e.g., a search engine company that has a clearly written policy on privacy protection) than to some “untrustable” parties (e.g., any third party who has access to the web search log). Note that $P(U)$ is precisely what is needed to help a search engine better understand the user’s in sequence need. Thus performing adapted search in some sense “requires” a user to release $P(U)$. Such tension has created a barrier for deploying personalized search applications, and the main challenge of privacy-preservation personalized search is to exploit $P(U)$ to help improve the search service for $U$ while protecting $P(U)$ as much as we can from being known by anyone else in the world. The User identity $ID(U)$ can generally be mapped to a single or a small group of users (e.g., family members) with the help of public databases.

For example, given an IP address, geographic in sequence such as city and state can be known through the who is service. This approach introduces uncertainty about individual values before data is published or released to third parties for Data mining purposes. To avoid such existing problems we introduce Apriori based suppression algorithm.
3. IMPLEMENTATION

In this paper our study is based on Apriori based data repression algorithm. Apriori algorithm used to find relevant search details of users from search engines (ex: Bing, Google, Youtube...). Apriori is designed to operate on databases containing transactions (for example, compilation of items bought by customers, or details of a website frequentation). Apriori uses a "bottom up" approach, where frequent subsets are comprehensive one item at a time (a step known as candidate generation), and groups of candidates are experienced against the data. The algorithm terminates when no additional successful extensions are found. The reason of the Apriori Algorithm is to find associations between different sets of data. It is sometimes referred to as "Market Basket Analysis". Each set of information has a number of items and is called a transaction. The output of Apriori is position of rules that tell us how often items are contained in sets of data.

3.1. Algorithm Pseudocode

The pseudocode for the algorithm [7] is given below for a transaction database \( T \) and a support threshold of \( \varepsilon \). Usual set theoretic notation is employed, though note that \( T \) is a multiset. \( C_i \) is the candidate set for altitude \( k \). Generate() algorithm is assumed to generate the candidate sets from the large item sets of the previous level, heeding the downward closure lemma. \( \text{Count}[c] \) accesses a field of the data organization that represents candidate set \( c \), which is primarily assumed to be zero. Many details are omitted below, usually the most significant part of the implementation is the data structure used for storing the candidate sets, and counting their frequencies.

Apriori (\( T, \varepsilon \))

\[ L_1 \leftarrow \{ \text{large 1-itemsets} \} \]

\[ k \leftarrow 2 \]

While \( L_{k-1} \neq \emptyset \)

For transactions \( t \in T \)

For candidates \( c \in C_i \)

\[ \text{count}[c] \leftarrow \text{count}[c] + 1 \]

\[ L_{k-1} \leftarrow \{ c \in C_i \mid \text{count}[c] \geq \varepsilon \} \]

\[ k \leftarrow k + 1 \]

3.2. Example:

A large supermarket tracks sales data by stock-keeping unit (SKU) for each thing, and thus is able to know what items are typically purchased together. Apriori is a moderately efficient way to build a list of frequent purchased item pairs from this information. Let the database of transactions consist of the sets \{1,2,3,4\}, \{1,2\}, \{2,3,4\}, \{2,3\}, \{1,2,4\}, \{3,4\}, and \{2,4\}. Each number corresponds to a product such as "butter" or "bread". The first step of Apriori is to count up the frequencies, called the supports, of every member item separately: This table explains the working of apriori algorithm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can define a minimum support level to qualify as "frequent," which depends on the context. For this case, let min support = 3. Therefore, all are frequent. The next step is to generate a list of all 2-pairs of the frequent items. Had any of the above items not been recurrent, they wouldn't have been included as a possible member of possible 2-item pairs. In this way, Apriori prunes the tree of all achievable sets. In next step we again select only these items (now 2-pairs are items) which are frequent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>{1,2}</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{2,3}</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{2,4}</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{3,4}</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
And generate a list of all 3-triples of the frequent items (by connecting frequent pairs with frequent single items). In the example, there are no frequent 3-triples. Most common 3-triples are \{1, 2, 4\} and \{2, 3, 4\}, but their support is equal to which is smaller than our min support. We consider the following privacy problem: A data holder wants to release a version of data for building classification models, but wants to protect against linking the released data to an external source for inferring sensitive information. We adjust an iterative bottom-up generalization from data mining to generalize the data. This approach incorporates partially the requirement of a targeted data mining task into the process of masking data so that essential structure is preserved in the masked data. The idea is easy but novel: we explore the data generalization concept from data mining as a way to hide detailed information, rather than discover trends and patterns. Once the data is masked, typical data mining techniques can be applied without modification.

Our work demonstrated another positive use of data mining technology: not only can it discover useful patterns, but also mask private information. Generalization has several advantages. First, it preserves the “truthfulness” of information, making the released data meaningful at the record level. This feature is desirable in exploratory and visual data mining where decisions often are made based on examining records. In contrast, randomized data are useful only at the aggregated level such as average and frequency. Second, preferences can be incorporated through the taxonomical hierarchies and the data recipient can be told what was done to the data so that the result can be properly interpreted.

3.3. Suppression:
We consider this method to suppress the data by doing so we can secure the data. The most common method of preventing the identification of specific individuals in tabular data is through cell containment. This means not providing counts in individual cells where doing so would potentially allow identification of a specific person to be secure.

We extend our work on micro data suppression
1. To prevent not only probabilistic but also decision tree classification based inference
2. To switch not only single but also multiple confidential data value suppression to reduce the side-effects.

3.4. Generalization:
A generalization, written \( f_{cg}(\text{feature coupling generalization}) \) ! \( p \), replaces all child values \( f_{cg} \) with the parent value \( p \). A simplification is valid if all values below \( c \) have been generalized to \( c \). A vid is generalized by \( f_{cg} \) ! \( p \) if the vid contains some value in \( f_{cg} \). In the existing paper this technique is used to hide the actual count of the url in the database (Anonymity for Classification)

Given a relation \( R \), an anonymity requirement \( < \text{VID}; K > \), and a hierarchy for each attribute in \( \text{VID} \), generalize \( R \) by a sequence of generalizations, to satisfy the requirement and contain as much information as possible for classification. The anonymity requirement can be satisfied in more than one way of generalizing \( R \), and some lose more information than others with regard to classification. One question is how to select a sequence of generalizations so that information loss is minimized. Another query is how to find this sequence of generalizations efficiently for a large data set. In this study, we observed that the generalization novelty factor in that it increased the number of distinct vids faster. When the number of distinct vids is large, the effectiveness of the suppression in “generalized-based” became more significant.

4. CONCLUSION
We have explore data mining as a performance for masking data, called data mining stand privacy protection. The idea is to explore the data simplification concept from data mining as approach to hide detailed information, slightly than discover trends and patterns. Formerly the data is masked, standard data mining performance can be applied without modification. Our work established another positive use of the data mining technology: not only can it determine useful patterns, but also mask classified information. In scrupulous, we presented a bottom-up overview for transforming specific data to less specific but semantically reliable data for privacy protection. We focused on two key concerns, privacy and scalability. The scalability issue was attending to by a novel data structure for focusing on good generalizations. The projected approach achieved a similar eminence but much better scalability compared to offered solutions.
5. FUTURE WORK

As with most offered work on perturbation based PPDM, our work is inadequate in the sense that it considers only linear attacks. More powerful opponents may apply nonlinear techniques to obtain original data and recover more information. Studying the MLT-PPDM difficulty under this adversarial replica is an interesting future direction.

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